








This paper gives an overview of results of the project “Beyond Timed Automata” carried out in the Col-
laborative Research Center AVACS (Automatic Veriﬁcation and Analysis of Complex Systems) of the Uni-
versities of Oldenburg, Freiburg, and Saarbru¨cken. We discuss how properties of high-level speciﬁcations
of real-time systems combining the dimensions of process behaviour, data, and time can be automatically
veriﬁed, exploiting recent advances in semantics, constraint-based model checking, and decision procedures
for complex data.
As speciﬁcation language we consider CS-OZ-DC, which integrates concepts from Communicating Sequential
Processes (CSP), Object-Z (OZ), and Duration Calculus (DC). Our approach to automatic veriﬁcation
of CSP-OZ-DC rests on a compositional semantics of this languages in terms of Phase-Event-Automata.
These can be translated into Transition Constraint Systems which serve as an input language of an abstract
reﬁnement model checker called ARMC which can handle constraints covering both real-time and inﬁnite
data. This is demonstrated by a case study concerning emergency messages in the European Train Control
System (ETCS). For CSP-OZ-DC we also discuss a UML proﬁle and tool support.
Keywords: Real-time systems, complex data, CSP, Object-Z, Duration Calculus, model checking, abstrac-
tion reﬁnement, UML proﬁle, tool support
1 Introduction
Computers are more and more used to control the behavior of complex systems,
for instance in the traﬃc domain. Such applications are typically safety critical,
i.e., a malfunction of the computers is costly and dangerous. Think of assistance
systems that should guarantee the collision freedom of traﬃc agents such as cars,
trains, and planes. Such applications necessitate the use of formal models of the
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overall system and of formal veriﬁcation for establishing the relevant safety proper-
ties. The models must be able to represent various aspects of the systems such as
state spaces and their transformation, communication between system components,
real-time constraints, interfaces to a continuously evolving physical environment,
and dynamically changing system structures. To cope with such models in a man-
ageable way, combined speciﬁcation techniques have been proposed, integrating well
researched speciﬁcation techniques for individual system aspects. It is a major re-
search challenge to develop methods for the automatic veriﬁcation and analysis of
such combined speciﬁcations modeling complex real-life systems.
To address this challenge the research center AVACS (Automatic Veriﬁcation
and Analysis of Complex Systems) was initiated in 2004. In AVACS, researchers
of the Universities of Oldenburg, Freiburg and Saarbru¨cken as well as the Max-
Planck-Institute for Informatics in Saarbru¨cken collaborate [2]. The idea of AVACS
is to bring experts in semantic modeling and speciﬁcation together with experts in
veriﬁcation and analysis techniques. Research in AVACS is organized in four layers:
(i) Complex Systems:
e.g., the European Train Control System (ETCS)
(ii) Models of Complex Systems:
real-time – hybrid – systems of systems
(iii) Combining Veriﬁcation and Analysis Technologies:
combine technologies t1, ..., tn for system s
(iv) Veriﬁcation and Analysis Kernel Technologies:
Abstraction – BDDs – Constraint Solving – Heuristic Search – Integer Linear
Programming – Model Checking – Lyapunov Method – SAT Solver – Theorem
Proving
At the top layer (i) are complex systems like the European Train Control System
(ETCS). In ETCS trains communicate wireless with radio block centers (RBCs)
that control the traﬃc in certain areas (see Fig. 1). The RBCs grant movement
authorities for trains up to a position closely behind the preceding train. In case of
an emergency incident of the ﬁrst train, the RBC has to ensure that this train and
all successive trains will stop safely in order to avoid collisions.
At the bottom layer (iv) there are various individual veriﬁcation and analysis
technologies like “Abstraction” or “Heuristic Search”. The idea is to combine at
layer (iii) such technologies in a suitable novel way so that particlar system classes
can be veriﬁed and analyzed. To be successful with such a combination, AVACS
pursues a divide and conquer strategy whereby (in the ﬁrst phase of the project)
systems are classiﬁed into real-time systems, hybrid systems, and systems of sys-
tems. The corresponding research areas are called R, H, and S, each organized into
three subprojects.
In this paper we give an overview of one subproject on real-time systems. These
are systems that interact with their environment in such a way that for certain inputs
the corresponding outputs have to occur within given time bounds. Many embedded
systems, in particular those in safety critical applications like the ETCS, are of this
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Fig. 1. Case study ETCS
type. The subproject presented here is called “R1: Beyond Timed Automata” and
it is coordinated by the author. R1 is motivated by the observation that currently
the behavioral veriﬁcation of speciﬁcations of real-time systems is based on their
representation as timed automata and relies on model checkers like UPPAAL [20]. A
limitation of this approach is that model checking with timed automata is restricted
to real-time systems with ﬁnite data only. However, in applications systems often
exhibit both real-time and complex, inﬁnite data structures.
The goal of R1 is to advance the state of the art in automatic veriﬁcation of
high-level speciﬁcations of systems with the three dimensions of process behaviour,
data, and real-time — beyond the capabilities of timed automata. In the ﬁrst
phase of R1, the core activities comprised the development of a system speciﬁcation
language, an approach to the automatic veriﬁcation of real-time properties, and
the application to the case study ETCS. As system speciﬁcation language, CSP-
OZ-DC (combining subsets from Communicating Sequential Processes, Object-Z,
and Duration Calculus) was developed [18,16]. A key result in this development
was a compositional semantics on the basis of Phase Event Automata (PEA), an
extension of timed automata to represent data [16]. It involves a translation of the
DC subsets of counterexample formulas (with events) and so-called test formulas
into equivalent PEA. It was shown that PEA can be translated into Transition
Constraint Systems (TCS), which serve as input for the abstraction reﬁnement model
checker ARMC [29] and the deductive slicing abstraction model checker SLAB [4].
While ARMC is based on predicate abstraction, SLAB is a combination of deductive
model checking (based on Craig interpolation) and slicing. Both tools call decision
procedures when checking entailment of constraints [13,36,37] as well as methods for
computing interpolants [35,32]. By combining CSP-OZ-DC with ARMC (or SLAB)
and decision procedures, properties of systems with both real-time constraints and
(certain) inﬁnite data types can be veriﬁed automatically, as demonstrated by case
studies [17]. In particular, real-time properties of emergency messages in the ETCS
case study were veriﬁed [23,11,22].
These core activities were complemented by research into reducing the size of
the state spaces of speciﬁcations with the help of slicing techniques. This approach
has been applied both at the level of CSP-OZ-DC [5,3] and at the level of TCS [4].
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This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the combined speciﬁcation lan-
guage CSP-OZ-DC is outlined. In Section 3 an approach to automatic veriﬁcation of
real-time properties of CSP-OZ-DC speciﬁcation is presented. Section 4 reports on
case studies preformed in this setting. Section 5 describes the tool support available
for the approach, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Combined Speciﬁcations
To specify real-time systems with a rich data part, we developed a high-level sys-
tem speciﬁcation language called CSP-OZ-DC [18,16] which separates the aspects of
process behavior, data, and time. CSP-OZ-DC combines concepts from Communi-
cating Sequential Processes (CSP) [14,31], Object-Z (OZ) [7,33], and the Duration
Calculus (DC) [41,40]. The central notion is that of a class, consisting of an inter-
face, a CSP part, an OZ part, and a DC part. An example of (part of) a class is
shown Fig. 2. It models the rear train in the ETCS for the case of two trains.
The idea is that the rear train measures its position periodically and adjusts its
speed so that is is always able to brake safely before reaching the limit of authority
(LOA) along the track by applying its service brake. For this purpose, it periodi-
cally computes the service brake intervention limit (SBI), which represents the last
position at which the train can apply the service brake in order to stop before the
current end of authority.
The class has three parameters: the identity ID of the train, the position
StartPos of the train at its start, and the position StartSBI of the SBI at its start.
The interface declares channel names and types used by the class. Here we see the
channels updPos for updating the train’s position and compSBI for computing the
next SBI.
The CSP part constrains the sequencing of events (communication) along the
interface channels using CSP process notation. It may consist of multiple processes
deﬁned by CSP process equations, one of which is a distinguished process named
main, which denotes the initial process. Here we see that the CSP part consists of
two subprocesses working in parallel (denoted by ‖|). The subprocess Running is
taking care of the normal operation of speed control and the subprocess HandleEM
takes care of emergency situations. The subprocess Running ﬁrst inputs the current
position pos of the train and the current limit of authority loa and then computes
the SBI in the state variable sbi . If the position pos of the train has got beyond the
value sbi the service brake has to be applied.
The OZ part speciﬁes the state space and operations upon it. It comprises a
nameless state schema describing the state space, a schema Init constraining the
initial state, and communication schemas com c describing the transformation of
the state space induced by communicating along an interface channel c. Here we
see that the state contains two variables sbi (for the current SBI) and curPos (for
the current position) of type Position and curSpd (for the current speed) of type
Speed . Of the communication schemas we exhibit the one for the channel compSBI
which speciﬁes how the new value of the variable sbi is deﬁned. The notation Δ(sbi)
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RearTrain(ID : TrainID ; StartPos, StartSBI : Position)
chan updPos : [id : {ID}, pos! : Position]







= updPos.ID ? pos → getLOA.ID ? loa → compSBI ! loa ? sbi →








loa?, sbi ! : Position
sbi ′ = loa? − TargetSpdDist − StopDist −MaxDist
sbi ! = sbi ′
. . .
¬ ( updPos ;  < updBound ;  updPos)
. . .
Fig. 2. A class in CSP-OZ-DC
of Object-Z deﬁnes that sbi is the only state variable changed by the schema.
The DC part constraints the timing of states and events. Here we see a so-
called counterexample formula that states a lower time bound: any two successive
communication events on the channel updPos should not be less than updBound
seconds apart.
The ETCS with two trains consists of several classes. Besides RearTrain there
are the classes for the LeadingTrain, the RBC, the CommunicationNetwork (be-
tween trains and RBC), the Track, and the Driver [22]. Objects of classes may
be combined into systems using the CSP operators of parallel composition and
renaming.
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2.1 UML Proﬁle
Often speciﬁers use diagrams to support their understanding of a system. To facil-
itate this, a UML proﬁle in the notations of UML 2.0 [39] has been developed for
CSP-OZ [25] and extended to CSP-OZ-DC. The proﬁle comprises class diagrams,
protocol state machines, and component diagrams. These diagrams are annotated
by suitable tags to represent the contents of classes in the form of Z and DC ex-
pressions. The semantics of the UML proﬁle is given by a translation of the proﬁle
into CSP-OZ-DC as illustrated by Fig. 3. For details of the CSP-OZ part we refer







Component DiagramState MachineClass Diagram
DC annotation
A
Fig. 3. Semantics of the UML proﬁle for CSP-OZ-DC
2.2 Operational Semantics
The key for an automatic veriﬁcation of CSP-OZ-DC is an operational semantics of
this language deﬁned by J. Hoenicke on the basis of Phase Event Automata (PEA)
[16]. PEA extend timed automata [1] such that the parallel composition synchro-
nizes on both phases (state formulae) and events. This permits the a compositional
semantics deﬁnition for CSP-OZ-DC, i.e., one satisfying the equation
A(CSP -OZ -DC ) = A(CSP) || A(OZ ) || A(DC )
where || denotes the (synchronous) parallel composition of PEA A(...). In fact,
A(DC ) decomposes even further into a parallel composition of PEA for each indi-
vidual timing constraint in the DC part. An important property of this semantics
is that whenever a subset of PEA in a parallel composition satisﬁes a requirement
(represented as a DC formula) then also the full parallel composition does. This
allows for a cone-of-inﬂuence veriﬁcation technique.
For the DC part the class of counterexample formulae (with facilities to constrain
the occurrences of both state changes and communication events) was introduced,
extending the well-known class of “DC implementables” by A.P. Ravn [30]. The
main theorem proved by J. Hoenicke in [16] is that every counterexample formula
F has an operational semantics in form of a deterministic PEA A(F ) such that the
runs of A(F ) are equivalent to the DC interpretations of F . The proof of this theo-
rem uses a so-called powerset construction to cope with the nondeterminism arising
from overlapping phases in F . Overlapping phases allow for concise speciﬁcations.
The determinism of A(F ) permits an easy treatment of negation, which underlies
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the speciﬁcation with counterexample formulae as well as an automata-theoretic
approach to model checking DC. In the latter approach, the desired property is
negated and then represented as a PEA running in parallel to the system.
For the real-time requirements, R. Meyer extended the class of translatable
formulae even further to so-called test formulae [21]. Whereas counterexample for-
mulae are negated traces (of timed phases), test formulae contain arbitrary Boolean
combinations of such traces and are closed under disjunction, conjunction, and the
DC chop. Using so-called sync events, test formulae can be brought into a disjunc-
tive normal form over traces and their negations, which facilitates their translation
into PEA. To date, test formulae are the largest class of DC formulae that have an
equivalent operational semantics in terms of automata [24].
Figure 4 shows the automaton PEAOZ representing the semantics of the OZ part
of the class in Fig. 2. Here updPos and comSBI are Boolean variables representing







updPos ∧ com updPos
comSBI ∧ com comSBI
. . .
Fig. 4. Phase Event Automaton PEAOZ for the OZ part of the class in Fig. 2
Note that for each communication schema in the OZ part there is a corresponding
transition labeled with the Boolean event variable and the formula of the commu-
nication schema, here com updPos and com comSBI . The idling transition φidle is
taken if none of the communications in the OZ part of the class is enabled. Here
φidle abbreviates the formula
φidle ⇔ ¬ updPos ∧ ¬ comSBI ∧ . . . ∧ sbi = sbi
′ ∧ curPos = curPos ′ ∧ . . .
Figure 5 shows the automaton PEADC representing the semantics of the counterex-
ample formula
¬ ( updPos ;  < 5 ; updPos )
in the DC part of the class in Fig. 2. Here c is a clock that is used to measure the
duration of 5 seconds.
3 Automatic Veriﬁcation
We consider the problem whether a given speciﬁcation CSP -OZ -DC satisﬁes a real-
time requirement expressed by a DC formula. The aim is an automatic veriﬁcation
method. Our approach is illustrated by the following scheme:





updPos, c := 0
c = 5 ∧ ¬ updPos
¬ updPos ¬ updPos
c = 5 ∧ updPos, c := 0
Fig. 5. Phase Event Automaton PEADC for the DC part of the class in Fig. 2
CSP -OZ -DC satisﬁes DC ?
↓ ↓
PEA: A(CSP) ‖ A(OZ ) ‖ A(DC ) ‖ Atest(DC )
Is the bad state of Atest(DC ) reachable ?
↓
TCS: T (...)
In order to check whether a speciﬁcation CSP -OZ -DC satisﬁes a real-time property,
represented by a test formula DC , both the speciﬁcation and the property are
translated to Phase Event Automata running in parallel. The property DC is
translated to a so-called test automaton Atest(DC ), which has a distinguished bad
state such that speciﬁcation CSP -OZ -DC satisﬁes the test formula DC if and only
if at the PEA level the bad state is reachable in Atest(DC ) as part of the overall
parallel composition.
To check for reachability we apply the abstraction reﬁnement model checker
ARMC developed by A. Podelski and A. Rybalchenko [28,29]. ARMC takes as input
Transition Constraint Systems (TCS). The PEA semantics of CSP-OZ-DC is very
well suited as an intermediate language in the translation process from CSP-OZ-DC
down to TCS. At the level of TCS, the clocks of PEA are represented as real-valued
data variables, following the “old-fashioned recipe” advocated by L. Lamport. As
an example consider the transition constraint system T (PEADZ) for the automaton
PEADZ for the DC constraint shown in Fig. 5:
T (PEADZ) ⇔ ph = 0 ∧ ¬updPos ∧ c ′ = c + len ∧ ph ′ = 0
∨ ph = 0 ∧ updPos ∧ c ′ = len ∧ c ′ ≤ 5 ∧ ph ′ = 1
∨ ph = 1 ∧ ¬updPos ∧ c ′ = c + len ∧ c ′ ≤ 5 ∧ ph ′ = 1
∨ ph = 1 ∧ updPos ∧ c = 5 ∧ c ′ = len ∧ c ′ ≤ 5 ∧ ph ′ = 1
∨ ph = 1 ∧ ¬updPos ∧ c = 5 ∧ c ′ = c + len ∧ ph ′ = 0
Here c is a real-valued variable representing the corresponding clock of PEADZ
and len is a real-valued variable with the constraint len > 0 that represents time
progress. The variables ph represents the current phase of PEADZ.
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3.1 Abstraction Reﬁnement
Veriﬁcation of temporal safety and liveness properties can be eﬀectively automated
by applying a reduction to least ﬁxpoint computation [6,27]. Such a ﬁxpoint com-
putation engine serves as a basis for the veriﬁcation tool ARMC [28,29]. ARMC
is a model checking tool that applies abstraction reﬁnement to eﬃciently handle
the high complexity of veriﬁcation tasks envisaged in the AVACS project. Its dis-
tinguishing characteristics lie in the way it applies logical reasoning to deal with
abstraction [29]. ARMC is implemented in a Prolog system together with Con-
straint Logic Programming extensions. Interpolation is an important component of
the abstraction reﬁnement algorithm used by ARMC. It provides an eﬀective means
for computing the separation between the sets of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states. ARMC
uses an algorithm for the generation of interpolants for the combined theory of lin-
ear arithmetic and uninterpreted function symbols [32]. It uses a reduction of the
problem to constraint solving in linear arithmetic, which allows for the application
of existing highly optimized Linear Programming solvers in black-box fashion.
Note that the PEA and hence the TCS representing the semantics of CSP-OZ-
DC speciﬁcations are in general inﬁnite state systems due to both clocks and data
values. So reachability is in general not decidable. Thus the ﬁxpoint computation
of ARMC need not terminate. However, as our case studies demonstrate, ARMC
can be applied successfully to various examples.
4 Case Studies
A ﬁrst application of this approach to veriﬁcation dealt with a parametric elevator
by J. Hoenicke and P. Maier [17]. In this example the number of ﬂoors are treated as
parameters. A safety property that depended on all parts of the speciﬁcation (i.e.,
communication, data, and time) was veriﬁed automatically with ARMC. The spec-
iﬁcation of the elevator in CSP-OZ-DC comprised both inﬁnite data (i.e., integers
representing an arbitrary number of ﬂoors) and continuous real-time.
4.1 Emergency Messages
The benchmark for the project “R1: Beyond Timed Automata” was deﬁned as the
veriﬁcation of timing requirements for the radio communication between trains and
the radio block center (RBC) in the ETCS. Starting from a comprehensive but
informal description of the ETCS in [9], J. Faber deﬁned the case study Emergency
Messages (EM) for the scenario where an RBC controls consecutive trains on a
track segment (see Fig. 1). In the case of two trains, if the ﬁrst train detects
an emergency situation it immediately applies the emergency brake and sends an
emergency message via the radio connection to the RBC, which has to inform the
follower train within a predeﬁned time interval. The train control system has to
stop the follower such that no collision occurs. This property depends on several
real-time requirements for the message transfer times and the reaction times of the
RBC and the follower.
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In [10,12,24], this case study is modeled in the speciﬁcation language CSP-OZ-
DC. The model involves continuous real time, real-valued variables representing
train positions (on an inﬁnite track segment) and speeds and messages transferred
via CSP channels. Other quantities like the length of the train and the braking
distance were treated as parameters. A part of one class of the speciﬁcation is shown
in Fig. 2. Then the techniques of Section 2 [17,16] were applied to translate the
CSP-OZ-DC model via Phase Event Automata (PEA) into Transition Constraint
Systems (TCS) that are the input of the abstraction reﬁnement model checker
ARMC [28,29].
For the case study EM, properties formalizing reaction times in the communi-
cation between trains and RBC could be veriﬁed automatically with ARMC. Thus
the benchmark for R1 was fully achieved.
However, the global property of collision freedom could not be veriﬁed automat-
ically with ARMC. The reasons are as follows. According to [16] each CSP-OZ-DC
speciﬁcation is represented as a parallel composition of PEA. In the case study
this composition consisted of 18 automata. At present ARMC requires the parallel
product of this composition to be computed. An attempt to compute the parallel
product of all 18 automata of EM failed due to memory shortage. By contrast, for
the veriﬁcation of the reaction times in the benchmark case it is suﬃcient to consider
only 5–7 of the automata and compute their parallel product. By the compositional
semantics [16] of CSP-OZ-DC, this allows us to infer the veriﬁed property for the
full parallel composition of all automata (without computing the product).
To prove collision freedom for the EM case study, a manual decomposition of
this property into simpler subtasks was performed. Each of these subtasks was a
variant of a reaction time property that could be veriﬁed automatically with ARMC.
Moreover, variants of the case study EM were examined which had a more
sophisticated and realistic data part, but a less complicated control structure: the
RBC maintains an array of consecutive trains (on an inﬁnite track segment) where
the size of the array is kept as a parameter. In case of an emergency, every train
behind the emergency train has to be instructed to stop (Fig. 1). Message transfer
times were not considered in this extended scenario. For this variant, collision
freedom for an arbitrary number of trains [19,11] could be shown. To cope with the
data type used for representing the train positions (in this case: arrays with integer
elements and real numbers as elements, with a parametric dimension) methods
for hierarchical reasoning in theories of complex data types developed in [34] were
employed.
5 Tool Support
Tool support has been developed to handle system speciﬁcations expressed in CSP-
OZ-DC, real-time requirements in form of test formulae, and their translation into
Phase Event Automata (PEA) and Transition Constraint Systems (TCS).
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5.1 Syspect
For CSP-OZ-DC speciﬁcations, a graphical modeling environment called Syspect
(System Speciﬁcation Tool) [38] has been implemented on the basis of the Eclipse
platform [8]. An overview of Syspect is given in Fig. 6. The graphic modeling
uses the UML proﬁle mentioned in Subsection 2.1. See Fig. 7 for a screen shot
of the class editor. The graphic model is automatically converted into an internal
representation of CSP-OZ-DC, which oﬀers the possibility to export the speciﬁcation
into their semantic model in terms of PEA for a subsequent veriﬁcation. To this
end, Syspect also permits to enter real-time requirements expressed as test formulae
(see Section 2). Test formulae also serve as the slicing criterion in a Slicing Plugin of
Syspect that has been implemented to perform slicing of CSP-OZ-DC speciﬁcations
in order to reduce their size [5,3].
Fig. 6. Overview of tool support
Since veriﬁcation is based on the transformation of PEA into TCS, the so-
called PEA toolkit [26] provides an automatic computation of the parallel product
of PEA and an automatic translation of PEA into TCS, the input representation
for both model checkers developed in R1, namely ARMC [29] as well as SLAB [4].
The latter integrates of slicing techniques with abstraction mechanisms. Moreover,
counterexample traces produced by ARMC can be automatically traced back to the
given high-level CSP-OZ-DC speciﬁcation and visualized in the Syspect tool [15].
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Fig. 7. Screen shot of Syspect
6 Conclusion
We have explained how real-time properties of systems speciﬁed in the combina-
tion CSP-OZ-DC can be automatically veriﬁed using recent advances in semantics,
constraint-based model checking, and decision procedures for complex data. The
veriﬁcation is based on the abstraction reﬁnement model checker ARMC that can
deal with variables ranging over continuous real-time and inﬁnite data.
A shortcoming of the current version of ARMC is that it cannot exploit the
parallel composition that is present in the Phase Event Automata (PEA). Since
ARMC expects as input Transition Constraint Systems (TCS) in disjunctive normal
form, the parallel product of PEA, which corresponds to the conjunction of TCS,
has to be computed before it can be handled by ARMC. For the full benchmark case
study this leads to state spaces that are too large to be computed (see Section 4).
This shortcoming will be addressed in the future work of the subproject R1.
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